The COVID-19 crisis: A public choice view

Many observers have been puzzled by the sight of otherwise freedom-loving citizens consenting to the stripping of their civil rights and the massive budgetary expansion of their governments in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Conversely, governments who ‘kept their cool’ such as those of Brazil and Sweden were heavily criticised by the Western media. Adopting James Buchanan's contractarian approach, this article seeks to model how the interplay between citizens and their government is affected by a health crisis. Citizens' increased willingness to pay for improved control of risks is found to play a major role.     

地方政府债务对工业资本配置效率的非线性影响效应——基于动态面板平滑转换回归PSTR模型的检验

经济新常态下,提高工业资本等要素配置效率是实现经济向高质量增长转变的必然要求。本文在政府主导、投资驱动的工业发展模式下,结合地方债务压力和金融发展差异门限变量,在非线性框架下运用动态面板平滑转换回归模型实证检验地方债务规模与工业资本配置效率的渐进演变关系。研究发现,适度的地方债务规模有助于提高资本配置效率,但随着债务压力增加,举债对资本配置的正效应逐步减弱并产生负效应。究其原因,适度举债能补齐工业基础设施短板,压低土地成本,对工业发展产生杠杆效应,从而提高资本配置效率;但过度举债推升财政风险,占用信贷资源并强化企业融资约束,造成资本配置低效率。此外,研究发现,地方信贷规模提升,能缓解举债的融资约束,促进工业行业间的资本流动;而工业金融深化程度提高,能增强市场竞争机制在要素配置中的作用,缓解举债造成投资错配,从而增强资本配置效率。以上分析结果表明,地方政府举债应更理性、适度、规范。     

Dynamic Cost Inefficiency of the European Union Meat Processing Firms

We apply dynamic data envelopment analysis (DEA) to estimate dynamic cost inefficiency for a sample of European Union (EU) large meat processing firms over the period 2005–2012 and decompose this into the contributions of technical and allocative inefficiency. The estimation of dynamic inefficiencies controls for adjustment costs associated with firms’ investments. We further contribute by measuring dynamic cost inefficiencies and their components with regard to own region group (managerial inefficiencies) and the gap between the pooled frontier and the region-specific frontier (programme inefficiencies). Results show that technical inefficiency tends to be the largest component of cost inefficiency when both conducting the analysis for the EU as a whole and estimating a region-specific frontier. Results suggest significant differences in cost, technical, and allocative inefficiencies between meat processing firms in eastern, western and southern EU countries. We also find that the gaps between the pooled and region-specific frontiers tend to be small to negligible, which suggests that the main source of pooled inefficiencies are shortcomings in managerial practices rather than differences in region-specific conditions.     

Debt Covenant Restriction,Financial Misreporting,and Auditor Monitoring*

Theory suggests that financial report-based debt covenants engender incentives for the manager to relax covenant constraints through accounting choices in order to avoid costly covenant violations. Prior studies directly testing this hypothesis in the context of financial misreporting fail to find consistent evidence. Using a more refined measure of debt covenant restriction, we find that debt covenant restriction is positively associated with the probability of financial statement misstatements. This positive association is driven by performance covenants rather than capital covenants and is more consistent with the manager striving to avoid a “false-positive” violation than to delay the violation. Our results also imply that managers resort to both income-increasing and non–income-increasing misreporting to relieve covenant constraints and rely more on the latter when faced with greater earnings management constraints. Additionally, the auditor charges higher audit fees to firms with more binding covenants even outside the violation state, and audit fees increase with constraints relative to both performance and capital covenants, reflecting greater financial reporting risk and bankruptcy risk, respectively. Within capital covenants, we find some evidence of even higher audit fees for tighter intangible-inclusive versus intangible-exclusive capital covenants. Lastly, our evidence suggests that the positive association between covenant constraints and misreporting is attenuated when the auditor has more experience with debt covenants, has greater bargaining power over the client, or faces greater litigation risk.     

Reelection,growth and public debt

In this work we examine how economic growth affects public debt when interacted with reelection prospects. Reelection considerations shorten political time horizons and give rise to political myopia that exacerbates debt accumulation. That laxer institutional reelection restrictions (e.g., no term limits) mitigate this effect due to electoral accountability is well known. Incorporating growth, we find that this mitigation can be reversed because less myopic, and more accountable, incumbents put more emphasis on smoothing the effects of growth across generations. We test these predictions using an annual-based panel of U.S. states over the period 1963–2010. Our identification strategy rests on constitutionally-entrenched differences in gubernatorial term limits that provide plausibly exogenous variation in reelection prospects, and aggregate national TFP shocks that are exogenous to individual states. Our estimates indicate that when reelection is possible a one standard deviation positive income shock induces, within the same year, a relative increase of approximately $40 in real per capita public debt.     

I (Could Have) Told You! Early warning indicators and crisis performance of the 12 “old” Euro-countries under the economic crisis 2008–09

The impact of the economic crisis 2008-09 was remarkably different in the 12 “old” member states in the Euro-zone. Five of them were hit especially badly; four of them even had to be bailed out by the rest in one way or another. This paper asks if one could have foretold, based solely on information available prior to 1999, which of the countries then about to enter the Euro-zone would run into economic trouble once a serious economic crisis occurred. The focus is on the (post)predictive power of three kinds of leading indicators: economic indicators, political indicators (indicating quality of governance), and indicators derived from the theory of optimal currency areas (OCA). Since there are more indicators than cases, PLS-regression is used to gauge the (post)predictive strength of the indicators examined. The results show that political indicators have quite some (post)predictive power in this case, whereas indicators derived from OCA-theory do not do too well. Economic indicators perform better than indicators derived from OCA-theory, but generally less well than the political indicators. Thus, the experience from the latest economic crisis in the Euro-zone suggests that more emphasis should be placed on the quality of governance record of a country when deciding if it should be deemed fit to become a member.     

Structural current accounts in the European Union countries: cross-sectional exploration

This paper investigates structural determinants of the current account balance and assesses whether the current accounts in the European Union countries were consistent with the calculated structural current accounts between 1995 and 2017. We estimate current account regressions using cross-sectional data for 94 countries in 2008–2016 and confirm the main findings with panel data estimates. We document that the current account depends on the real exchange rate in a nonlinear way. The real exchange rate affects the current account at low income levels, but it ceases to be important at high income levels. Based on structural current account estimates for the European Union countries, we document that after the 2008 crisis current accounts adjusted towards structural current accounts in deficit countries, but persisted above structural current accounts in surplus countries.     

The risk-based approach under the new EU data protection regulation: a critical perspective

Abstract

The first broad reform of personal data protection legislation in the European Union entered into force in May 2018 (Regulation (EU) 2016/679, the General Data Protection Regulation). Remarkably, with this reform a risk-based approach has been introduced as the core data protection enforcement model, while data protection authorities see their regulatory role significantly weakened. The risk-based approach is to be implemented by the data controllers (i.e. the operators) via data protection impact assessments (evoking the established environmental impact assessment procedure) and notification of breaches, among other procedures. Hence the scope of both the concepts of risk and risk regulation spread beyond conventional domains, namely the environment, public health or safety, i.e. physical risks, to encompass risks to intangible values, i.e. individual rights and freedoms, presumably harder to assess and manage. Strikingly, the reform has been accompanied by a confident discourse by EU institutions, and their avowed belief in the reform’s ability to safeguard the fundamental right to data protection in the face of evolving data processing techniques, specifically, big data, the Internet of Things, and related algorithmic decision-making. However, one may wonder whether there isn’t cause for concern in view of the way the risk-based approach has been designed in the data protection legislation. In this article, the risk-based approach to data protection is analysed in the light of the reform’s underlying rationality. Comparison with the risk regulatory experience in environmental law, particularly the environmental impact assessment procedure, is drawn upon to assist us in pondering the shortcomings, as well as the opportunities of the novel risk-based approach.     

Why Do Politicians Intervene in Accounting Regulation? The Role of Ideology and Special Interests

Politicians frequently intervene in the regulation of financial accounting. Evidence from the accounting literature shows that regulatory capture by special interests helps explain these interventions. However, many accounting rules have broad economic or social consequences, such as their effects on income distribution or private sector subsidies. The perception of these consequences varies with a politician's ideology. Therefore, if accounting rules produce those consequences, ideology plausibly spills over and explains a politician's stance on the technical accounting issue, beyond special interest pressure. We use two prominent U.S. political debates about fair value accounting and the expensing of employee stock options to disentangle the role of ideology from special interest pressure. In both debates, ideology explains politicians’ involvement at exactly those points when the debate focuses on the economic consequences of accounting regulation (i.e., bank bailouts and top management compensation). Once the debates focus on more technical issues, connections to special interests remain the dominant force.     

Do differences in national cultures affect cross-country conditional conservatism behavior under IFRS?

The purpose of this paper is to explore whether international differences in cultural dimensions of individualism and uncertainty avoidance affect how managers from different countries implement International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and influence cross-country conditional conservatism behavior. We analyze the conditional conservatism behavior of publicly listed firms in 14-member countries of the European Union (EU) during the period 2006-2016. The results confirm the relationship between the individualism and uncertainty avoidance dimensions of national culture and conditional conservatism in the post-IFRS period. Particularly, conditional conservatism is higher in countries where individualism is lower and where uncertainty avoidance is higher.